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SEARCHING FOR A HARMLESS ALTERNATIVE:  
APPLYING THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD 
TO ALTERNATIVE THEORY 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Erika A. Khalek* 
 
―The well-being of the law encompasses a tolerance 
for harmless errors adrift in an imperfect world.‖1 
 
Judges in federal criminal cases provide juries with instructions before 
the jury members retire to consider their verdict.  In some situations, the 
judge may include alternative theories of guilt, informing the jury that it 
may convict a defendant of a single offense on the basis of one of several 
different theories.  But because most juries in federal criminal trials deliver 
only a general verdict of either “guilty” or “not guilty,” it is usually not 
possible to determine the theory upon which the jury relied in reaching its 
decision.  This lack of transparency may be problematic if the defendant 
appeals his conviction on the basis of an alleged “alternative theory 
error,” which occurs when one—but not all—of the theories in the jury 
instruction is subsequently found to have been invalid.  A reviewing court 
must then determine whether the defendant is entitled to relief as a result of 
the erroneous instruction, which it assesses by reference to the harmless 
error standard of review. 
The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining whether 
an alternative theory error is harmless in Hedgpeth v. Pulido.  Pulido 
requires a reviewing court to determine whether the relevant error “had 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict.”  However, the circuits are divided in their interpretation of this 
standard.  Some circuits have interpreted the rule as imposing a less 
demanding standard on the defendant-appellant to establish grounds for 
reversal, merely requiring it to be shown, for example, that the jury did not 
necessarily make the findings to rely on the valid theory of guilt.  Other 
circuits, however, impose a more demanding standard, for example, finding 
an error harmless unless the defendant-appellant can show not only that the 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Washington & Lee 
University.  I would like to thank my family, friends, and Ben for their love and support, as 
well as Professor Ian Weinstein for his guidance and advice. 
 
 1. A sentiment of Justice Roger J. Traynor in his foreword to THE RIDDLE OF 
HARMLESS ERROR, at ix (1970). 
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jury did not necessarily rely on the valid theory of guilt, but also had 
evidence that could rationally lead to an acquittal on the basis of the valid 
theory. 
This Note examines the historical development of the Supreme Court’s 
alternative theory error standard so as to better understand why the circuit 
courts have diverging interpretations.  It also considers the impact of 
general verdicts on harmless error review, particularly as compared to 
special verdicts.  Ultimately, this Note concludes that all circuits should 
place a heavier burden on the government to defend the harmlessness of 
alternative theory errors. 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 297 
I.   INSTRUCTION MANUAL:  JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE HARMLESS 
ERROR STANDARD ......................................................................... 299 
A.   Jury Instructions and the Verdict Forms:  Clear or 
Confusing? .............................................................................. 299 
1.   Jury Instructions Generally ............................................... 300 
2.   The General and Special Verdict Forms ........................... 300 
3.   A Jury‘s Understanding of the Instructions ...................... 303 
B.   The Harmless Error Review Standard:  Evolving 
Complexity .............................................................................. 305 
1.   Pre-Harmless Error Review .............................................. 305 
2.   Introduction and Development of the Harmless Error 
Review Standard ............................................................... 307 
a.   Harmless Error Standard Applied to Constitutional 
Errors ......................................................................... 308 
b.   Harmless Error Standard Applied on Direct and 
Collateral Review ....................................................... 310 
c.   Empirical Studies Examining the Harmless Error 
Standard’s Effect on Judgments ................................. 311 
3.   The Harmless Error Standard as Applied to Alternative 
Theory Jury Instructions ................................................... 313 
II.   ALTERNATIVE THEORIES:  THE CIRCUITS‘ DIVERGING 
APPLICATIONS OF THE HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW STANDARD 
TO ALTERNATIVE THEORY ERRORS ............................................... 316 
A.   Circuits Maintaining a Heavy Burden on the Government to 
Defend Harmlessness .............................................................. 316 
1.   Tenth Circuit ..................................................................... 317 
2.   Second Circuit ................................................................... 318 
3.   Fourth Circuit .................................................................... 321 
4.   Seventh Circuit.................................................................. 323 
B.   Circuits Maintaining a Less Demanding Burden on the 
Government to Defend Harmlessness ..................................... 324 
1.   Ninth Circuit ..................................................................... 324 
2.   Fifth Circuit ....................................................................... 326 
2014] SEARCHING FOR A HARMLESS ALTERNATIVE 297 
III.   DETERMINING THE CORRECT STANDARD:  WHAT AMOUNTS TO 
―SUBSTANTIAL AND INJURIOUS‖? .................................................. 328 
A.   An Alternative Possibility:  Requiring Special Verdicts in 
Cases Involving Alternative Theory Errors ............................ 328 
B.   Who Has It Right?:  Differentiating the Circuits’ 
Conflicting Applications of the Harmless Error Review 
Standard to Alternative Theory Errors ................................... 330 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 332 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Before a jury in a federal criminal case is discharged to consider its 
verdict, the judge provides it with instructions (which it is required to 
follow) regarding how to apply the law to the evidence it has heard in order 
to render a verdict.2  These instructions may include an ―alternative theory 
jury instruction.‖  An alternative theory jury instruction provides a jury with 
two or more different theories of guilt, each of which would be sufficient to 
convict the defendant separate and apart from the other.3  This possibility 
arises because a defendant may be charged with ―the commission of any 
one offense in several ways.‖4  But because most cases in federal court 
require the jury to return a general verdict5—i.e., to find the defendant 
simply ―guilty‖ or ―not guilty‖—it is often impossible to discern how the 
jury came to its decision and, in the case of alternative theory jury 
instructions, which of the theories, if any, the jury followed.6  This 
uncertainty may present challenges to a judge reviewing an alternative 
theory jury instruction, for example where a jury renders a general verdict 
in reliance on an instruction comprised of alternative (or multiple) theories 
of guilt, and one of these theories is invalid in some respect.7  This result is 
referred to as an alternative theory error. 
 
 2. See Torrence Lewis, Toward a Limited Right of Access to Jury Deliberations, 58 
FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 198 n.8 (2006). 
 3. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008) (per curiam). 
 4. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136 (1985) (holding that if the offense and its 
elements are completely spelled out, the constitutional right to a grand jury is not violated, 
even if the indictment alleges other means of committing the same crime). 
 5. Donald Olander, Note, Resolving Inconsistencies in Federal Special Verdicts, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 6. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367–68 (1931) (―The verdict 
against the appellant was a general one.  It did not specify the ground upon which it rested.  
As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was instructed that their 
verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is 
impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained.  If any one 
of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be 
determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.  It may 
be added that this is far from being a merely academic proposition . . . .‖). 
 7. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1905 (2012) (citing Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61).  This is only one of various types of alternative 
theory jury instructions. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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When a verdict is challenged on the basis of an alternative theory error, it 
is usually subjected to harmless error review to determine whether the error 
is ―harmless‖ and so the verdict may stand despite the error.8  Most errors 
reviewed under a harmless error standard are found to be harmless,9 and 
although the U.S. Supreme Court in Hedgpeth v. Pulido10 provided a 
standard for determining whether such an error is harmless—namely, 
whether the flaw in the instructions ―had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury‘s verdict‖11—the federal circuit courts are 
divided in their applications of this standard.  Some circuits interpret the 
Supreme Court‘s standard to impose a more demanding standard on a 
defendant-appellant to garner a reversal by proving an error was not 
harmless, thereby placing a less demanding burden on the government.  For 
example, the Fifth Circuit looks to see whether evidence in the record 
―could rationally lead to‖ an acquittal when only the valid theory is 
considered.12  In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has held that where one theory 
for conviction is invalid, a verdict may be sustained only if it is possible to 
discern that the jury relied on the valid ground or ―necessarily made the 
findings required to support a conviction on the valid ground.‖13  The 
varying interpretations are significant because a defendant in a circuit in 
which it is easier to show an error is not harmless may be granted relief in a 
situation where that defendant, if he were in a circuit imposing a more rigid 
standard, may have been denied relief (and vice versa). 
For example, in United States v. Skilling,14 the former chief executive 
officer of Enron Corporation was charged with, among other things, one 
count of conspiracy based on his efforts to fraudulently manipulate Enron‘s 
financial statements to affect Enron‘s share price and so mislead 
investors.15  The jury instructions allowed the jury to convict the defendant 
of conspiracy under a number of theories, and the jury returned a general 
verdict finding him guilty.16  Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court 
determined that one of the theories under which the defendant had been 
charged was invalid, and so the case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to 
determine whether the error in the instruction was harmless.17  The Fifth 
Circuit places a lesser burden on the government to defend a conviction, 
requiring the defendant-appellant to show that ―the record contains 
evidence that could rationally lead to [an acquittal] with respect to the 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B.2–3. 
 9. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error 21 (U. Chi. Law 
& Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 101, 2000), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=233929. 
 10. 555 U.S. 57 (2008). 
 11. Id. at 58 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 
 12. Skilling, 638 F.3d at 482. 
 13. United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104, 1110 n.6 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 
 14. 638 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 15. Id. at 481, 488. 
 16. Id. at 481. 
 17. Id. (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 413–15 (2010)). 
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[valid theory of guilt].‖18  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the jury 
instruction error was harmless and upheld the jury‘s verdict.19 
The Fifth Circuit emphasized, however, that it had conducted its analysis 
pursuant to Pulido, which it interpreted as requiring the defendant-appellant 
to show more than the mere fact that the jury did not necessarily find facts 
establishing guilt on a valid theory for an alternative theory error to be not 
harmless.20  The court distinguished its interpretation of Pulido from that of 
those circuits that seem to place a heavier burden on the government to 
defend an error as harmless.21  It explicitly noted that the government had 
introduced evidence at trial that was sufficient to convict the defendant on 
one theory of fraud but not the other, which could amount to error that is 
not harmless in heavier burden circuits.22  Skilling, therefore, illustrates that 
varying tests are applied across circuit courts to determine whether an error 
is harmless, and that the diverging tests affect the relief granted to 
defendants on appeal. 
I.   INSTRUCTION MANUAL:  JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD 
While the Court has always stood by the principle that the right to a fair 
trial is a ―fundamental right,‖23 which is protected under the Due Process 
Clauses and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,24 the scope of 
errors in the trial process requiring reversal has narrowed significantly since 
the nineteenth century, when even trivial trial errors could require reversal 
at the expense of judicial economy and fairness.25 
Part I.A provides some background on the function of jury instructions in 
the judicial process, with special attention given to alternative theory jury 
instructions.  Part I.B then tracks the development of the harmless error 
standard of review, focusing on the federal legislation and court decisions 
that have shaped the current standard.  Finally, Part I.C explains how the 
Court has applied the harmless error review standard to alternative theory 
jury instructions. 
A.   Jury Instructions and the Verdict Forms:  Clear or Confusing? 
This section first provides background information on jury instructions, 
including noteworthy aspects of alternative theory jury instructions, to more 
clearly elucidate their practical impact.  This section then explains the 
 
 18. Id. at 482 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)) (emphasis added). 
 19. See id. at 481. 
 20. See id. at 482. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 484 n.4. 
 23. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
 25. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness:  Method and Madness in the 
Supreme Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 314 
(2002); see also Nolan E. Clark, Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83, 
84 (1967). See generally TRAYNOR, supra note 1. 
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general verdict (as compared to the special verdict) and discusses its 
implications for convictions.  Finally, this section examines past empirical 
studies assessing the frequency of errors in instructions as applied to the 
two verdict forms. 
1.   Jury Instructions Generally 
Commentators have expressed the view that jury instructions may be the 
most critical part of a trial.26  It is argued that this is because the 
instructions not only explain the law to nonlawyers, but because they also 
―appear at the crossroads in a trial, when the focus is shifting from the 
witness box to the jury box, and when the jury is turning from listening to 
deciding.‖27  The fact that a jury must be unanimous in its decision is 
closely connected to this view, and perhaps underscores it.28 
When instructing the jury, a federal district court judge must provide 
guidance as to the relevant law but exercises broad discretion in doing so.29  
Generally, the judge must give ―reasonable guidance.‖30 
Counsel for each party may prepare and submit a written request for 
instructions.31  The court is not obligated to adopt the language submitted 
by a party, however, where the instructions prepared by the court state the 
substance of the law clearly and accurately.32 
2.   The General and Special Verdict Forms 
Most federal civil cases that proceed to a nonbench trial are resolved 
through a general verdict, where a jury announces the prevailing party and 
 
 26. See 1 KEVIN F. O‘MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 7 App. (6th ed. 2006) (citing M.M. Cramer, A View from the 
Jury Box, 6 LITIG. 3 (1979); John Kennelly, Closing Arguments:  Instructions Are the Key, 6 
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 53 (1962)).  Joan Eads, a seasoned trial lawyer who was selected to serve 
as a juror in a medical malpractice suit, shared her reflections following this experience, 
emphasizing that ―the court‘s instructions were by far the most important factor in [the 
jury‘s] decision.‖ See Joan Eads, A Lawyer’s View from the Jury Box, TRIAL, Apr. 2004, at 
76, 77. 
 27. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7 App. 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b); 9B ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2492 (3d ed. 2008) (citing Am. Publ‘g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 
464, 468 (1897)). 
 29. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7:1. 
 30. See id. (―In charging the jury, the trial judge is not limited to instructions of an 
abstract sort.  It is within his province, whenever he thinks it necessary, to assist the jury in 
arriving at a just conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence, by drawing 
their attention to the parts of it which he thinks important, and he may express his opinion 
upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to 
their determination.‖ (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933))). 
 31. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7:2. 
 32. See id.  The procedural requirements of jury instructions are governed by the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure with respect to criminal cases and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure with respect to civil cases, both of which provide that a party may request the 
court to instruct the jury on a particular law, as set out in the request. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
30; FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
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the amount awarded to him, if any.33  The process is similar in federal 
criminal proceedings, where a jury announces a verdict of ―guilty‖ or ―not 
guilty.‖34  The general verdict grants the jury broad discretion to determine 
the factors it considers relevant when deliberating.35 
In contrast, a jury that renders a special verdict ―finds facts without 
reference to the success of either litigant.‖36  Special verdicts originated in 
England as early as the twelfth century.37  At that time, jurors were selected 
based on their knowledge of the subject matter.38  If a judge found that the 
jury had erred it its decision, a second jury would review the case.39  If that 
jury‘s decision differed from that of the original jury, the original jurors 
were ―severely punished.‖40  Consequently, the special verdict was 
introduced to protect juries from attaint (dishonor).41 
Today, Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an 
alternative to the general verdict:  a special verdict.  Rule 49(a) authorizes 
courts to require a jury to return a special verdict, which answers specific 
factual questions, rather than a general verdict, which simply announces the 
prevailing party.42  Although special verdicts are used primarily in civil 
cases, if at all, they are also used on rare occasions in criminal cases.43 
 
 33. Shaun P. Martin, Rationalizing the Irrational:  The Treatment of Untenable Federal 
Civil Jury Verdicts, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 683, 694 (1995) (citations omitted); Olander, 
supra note 5, at 1089 (citations omitted). 
 34. See Kate H. Nepveu, Note, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”:  Giving Special 
Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 263, 263 (2003). 
 35. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7 App. 
 36. Suel O. Arnold, Special Verdicts, 6 AM. JURIS. TRIALS 1043, 1046 (1967). 
 37. Robert Dudnik, Note, Special Verdicts:  Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 485 (1965) (citing Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of 
Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923)). 
 38. Id. at 484–85. 
 39. Id. at 485. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 484. 
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a).  Rule 49(a) provides three different methods by which a 
court may require a special verdict:  ―(A) submitting written questions susceptible of a 
categorical or other brief answer; (B) submitting written forms of the special findings that 
might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or (C) using any other method 
that the court considers appropriate.‖ Id.  A special verdict is slightly different than an 
interrogatory, which is authorized under FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).  Rule 49(b) explains that an 
interrogatory requires the jury to answer specific factual questions in conjunction with 
providing a general verdict. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b); see David William Navarro, Jury 
Interrogatories and the Preservation of Error in Federal Civil Cases:  Should the Plain-
Error Doctrine Apply?, 30 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 1163, 1193 (1999). 
 43. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 360–61 (15th ed. 1809) 
(stating that a ―verdict may be either general, guilty, or not guilty; or special, setting forth all 
the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the court, whether, for instance, 
on the facts stated, if it be murder, manslaughter, or no crime at all‖); see United States v. 
Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (citing Blackstone for the proposition that 
―[s]pecial verdicts are as old a feature of the jury system as are general verdicts‖); see also 
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 n.41 (1st Cir. 1969) (―There are only two classes 
of cases in which such findings have been used.  First, in certain cases the determination of a 
particular fact will be crucial to sentencing the defendants, as, for example, which of the 
several objects of a conspiracy, some felonies, some misdemeanors, the defendant agreed to, 
or the duration of a defendant‘s participation in a conspiracy.‖). 
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Moreover, courts largely no longer employ ―true‖ special verdicts, where 
a jury does not render a verdict of guilty or not guilty at all, but instead 
merely provides specific findings of fact.44  Special verdicts today are more 
likely to supply additional information in conjunction with a general 
verdict.45 
There are at least three acknowledged advantages of special verdicts as 
compared to general verdicts.46  First, special verdicts promote a jury 
system of fairness and effectiveness by affording the public—and the 
litigants—a better understanding of how the jury came to its decision.47  
Second, special verdicts decrease the likelihood of juror error or confusion 
because the application of the law to the facts remains with the judge.48  
Finally, retrials based on errors identified on appeal can be limited or 
avoided.49  For example, if an error affects a special verdict, it is usually 
clear which of the jury‘s findings are affected by the error.50  Thus, where a 
second trial is required, it can be cabined to only the specific findings 
affected.51 
Consequently, whereas ―in a suit involving two or more theories of 
liability, an appellate court cannot ascertain from a general verdict which 
theory or theories the jury relied upon in rendering its verdict,‖52 special 
verdicts ―enable the jury to make special written findings on every issue of 
fact in a particular case.‖53  Thus, special verdicts allow for easier location 
of error,54 and as such, could benefit appellate courts by providing a clearer 
 
 44. Nepveu, supra note 34, at 264.  Nepveu notes:  ―The increased use of special verdict 
forms and special interrogatories raises a number of questions which appear to have escaped 
academic attention, judging from the infrequent discussion of special verdicts in the 
literature.‖ Id. 
 45. See id. at 263–64. 
 46. Martin, supra note 33, at 696. 
 47. Id. (citing Olander, supra note 5, at 1092).  Special verdicts may also make it harder 
for the jury to see how its findings affect the final determination in the case, thus eliminating 
―bias, prejudice, and jury caprice.‖ 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2503, at 155 (2d ed. 1995); see also Navarro, supra 
note 42, at 1192. 
 48. Martin, supra note 33, at 696 (citing Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 
1514, 1520 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Olander, supra note 5, at 1090–91. 
 49. Martin, supra note 33, at 696 (citing Olander, supra note 5, at 1091). 
 50. Olander, supra note 5, at 1091–92. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Elizabeth Cain Moore, Note, General Verdicts in Multi-Claim Litigation, 21 MEM. 
ST. U. L. REV. 705, 705 (1991). 
 53. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)).  Appellate courts have encouraged the use of 
special verdicts in multiclaim litigation. See id. at 706 (citing Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 
F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir. 1989); Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1299–301 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Nowell v. Universal Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1317 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1986)).  
Moore quoted the Fifth Circuit‘s endorsement of the use of FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a):  ―Special 
interrogatories . . . are helpful to a jury because they reduce an otherwise complex trial to its 
simplest and most important issues.  The genuine issues are distilled and an appellate court is 
often aided immeasurably when it is called on to review the case.‖ Id. at 706 n.6 (quoting 
Nowell, 792 F.2d at 1317). 
 54. Id. at 705 (citing Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 
253, 258 (1920)). 
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record for review.55  The judiciary has also expressed that it may consider 
greater use of special verdicts or instructive interrogatories, where the jury 
answers specific questions but also renders a general verdict.56 
General verdicts, however, have their own set of advantages over special 
verdicts.  First, a general verdict prevents the jury from returning 
inconsistent responses.57  If a jury returns responses that cannot be 
reconciled, a judgment cannot be entered, requiring a retrial.58  Further, a 
general verdict implies findings in favor of the prevailing party on each 
contested issue of fact that the jury reviews, which could streamline review 
on appeal.59  Finally, supporters of the general verdict find that it is 
preferable to the special verdict because ―it permits the jury to do that 
which it should do—that is, leaven the strict law with man-on-the-street 
justice.‖60 
3.   A Jury‘s Understanding of the Instructions 
Commentators maintain a wide variety of views as to whether and to 
what extent a jury understands the instructions provided by a court.  One 
view expresses the common assumption that a jury understands and 
complies with all instructions.61  On the other end of the spectrum exists the 
view ―that a jury in the main is mystified by the legal abstraction in an 
instruction, even when the instruction is not doubly complicated.‖62  While 
the former view rationalizes more frequent reversal because of an erroneous 
jury instruction, the latter supports more frequently finding an error 
harmless, as it claims instructions have very little influence on the jury.63  
 
 55. Nepveu, supra note 34, at 269.  Justice Blackmun has voiced his support for this 
viewpoint. See id. at 278 n.123 (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 61 (1991) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the government could have either separated the 
objectives into separate counts or given special interrogatories)); see also O‘MALLEY ET AL., 
supra note 26, at § 7 App. (citation omitted). 
 56. Nepveu, supra note 34, at 278 (citation omitted). 
 57. See Olander, supra note 5, at 1092. 
 58. Id. (citations omitted).  Inconsistent findings may be reconciled where possible. Id. 
(citing Gallick v. Balt. & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963); Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. 
Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). 
 59. ROBERT E. JONES ET AL., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICAL GUIDE:  FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS 
AND EVIDENCE Ch. 18-A (citing Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); Freeman v. 
Chi. Park Dist., 189 F.3d 613, 615 (7th Cir. 1999)).  The guide notes, however, that a general 
verdict may require reversal for error found on appeal ―because the reviewing court cannot 
determine the basis for the jury‘s verdict.‖ Id. (citations omitted). 
 60. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 8:9 (citing Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency 
of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 
246–48 (1961)).  The authors noted that FED. R. CIV. P. 49 had powerful dissidents who 
argued for its repeal, including former U.S. Supreme Court Justices Hugo L. Black and 
William O. Douglas. Id.  The justices referred to the rule as ―but another means utilized by 
courts to weaken the constitutional power of juries.‖ Amendments to Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 587, 619 (1963) (statement of 
Justices Black and Douglas rejecting the adoption of the 1963 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 61. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 73. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Yet, commentators also express another view:  it is impossible to know 
whether a jury understood and followed instructions, and thus it is 
impossible to know whether an error matters.64 
Empirical evidence reveals conflicting findings as to whether juries 
generally understand and follow instructions.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
where juries understand and follow instructions, it is more difficult for an 
appellate court to find that an error did not influence the verdict if the error 
involves an issue material to the case.65  Linguists who have studied and 
tested jury instructions, however, ―have found disturbingly low levels of 
understanding within juries, and have attributed these problems to writing 
structures.‖66  One commentator, following experiences on both civil and 
criminal juries, expressed the view that juries do not understand how to 
apply law to the facts at hand.67  To improve the jury process, the 
commentator recommended the following:  (1) when instructing the jury at 
the end of the case, the judge should encourage the jury to break each 
charge into its required elements and treat each element separately to 
determine if the evidence supports each element; and (2) where the 
jurisdiction permits the court to summarize evidence, the judge should 
weave the evidence into the instructions, ―or use the threat of doing so to 
induce counsel to link the evidence to the law in their closing arguments.‖68 
Where juries are required to provide a special verdict, rather than a 
general verdict, evidence has revealed that jurors ―reported feeling better 
informed, more satisfied that their verdict was correct, more confident that 
their verdict reflected a proper understanding of the judge‘s instructions, 
and more satisfied that the prosecutor was helpful.‖69  Nonetheless, the 
ultimate benefits to a jury‘s decision are unclear.70  Moreover, ―[s]pecial 
 
 64. Id. (citation omitted). 
 65. Id. at 74; cf. Robert and Veda Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:  A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979) (providing 
empirical evidence illustrating juries‘ limited comprehension of jury instructions). 
 66. See O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7 App. (citing, as an example, Charrow, 
supra note 65). 
 67. Christopher N. May, “What Do We Do Now?”:  Helping Juries Apply the 
Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 870 (1995). 
 68. Id.; see also O‘MALLEY ET AL., supra note 26, at § 7 App. (providing examples of 
specific guidance to ensure clarity for the jury). 
 69. Nepveu, supra note 34, at 265 (citing Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial 
Complexity:  A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
29, 50 (1994)).  The survey underlying the study polled both criminal and civil jurors. Heuer, 
supra, at 50. 
 70. See Nepveu, supra note 34, at 265 (citing Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. 
Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 
19 (1990) (finding that, based on evidence from a mock trial simulation, general verdicts 
were unaffected by the use of special verdicts)).  The Wiggins study researchers 
hypothesized this result occurred because ―the effect of a particular answer was obvious to 
the jury, allowing their overall impressions of the parties . . . to affect their answers.‖ Id. at 
265 (citing Wiggins & Breckler, supra, at 27, 32).  ―While the jurors who were given special 
verdicts understood better the legal question of burden of proof, they did no better . . . in 
applying that knowledge to fact patterns.‖ Id. (citing Wiggins & Breckler, supra, at 28–29). 
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problems‖ arise when a jury is advised on alternative theories of guilt, 
which are charged rather commonly.71 
B.   The Harmless Error Review Standard:  Evolving Complexity 
―[T]he evaluation of an error as harmless or prejudicial is one of the most 
significant tasks of an appellate court, as well as one of the most 
complex.‖72  As this section illustrates, the harmless error review standard 
was developed gradually and continues to evolve today.  This section first 
examines judicial review prior to the introduction of the harmless error 
standard.  It then discusses the initial era following Congress‘s enactment of 
the harmless error doctrine, and how the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of 
the doctrine affected the spectrum of errors that may be assessed under it.  
Finally, this section focuses on the application of the harmless error review 
standard in the context of alternative theory jury instructions. 
1.   Pre-Harmless Error Review 
Throughout the nineteenth century, both English and U.S. courts liberally 
reversed convictions due to even trivial trial errors.73  Nevertheless, a 
defendant faced significant challenges if he wished to appeal, as the 
opportunity to appeal a conviction was limited.74 
 
 71. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT 107 (2d ed. 2007). 
 72. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 80. 
 73. See William Wesley Patton, To Err Is Human, to Forgive, Often Unjust:  Harmless 
Error Analysis in Child Abuse Dependency Proceedings, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‘Y 
99, 102 (2009); see also Martha S. Davis, Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and Habeas 
Jurisprudence:  The Beast That Swallowed the Constitution, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45, 46 
(1999). 
 74. The forerunner to the right to appeal conviction for a criminal offense—a writ of 
error in favor of the defendant—was only introduced in the nineteenth century. See Marc M. 
Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 
522–23 (1992) (citation omitted).  Whether to issue a writ of error was entirely at the 
discretion of the circuit court judge. Id. at 523.  The early development of the criminal 
appeal process occurred primarily in state courts, as criminal law fell largely within the 
purview of state common and statutory law rather than federal law. See id. at 528.  In 1894, 
the Supreme Court in McKane v. Durston unanimously held that a defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction because the common law did not afford 
it. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); see also Arkin, supra, at 505.  The Court 
expressed the view that it fell within a state‘s discretion to determine ―whether an appeal 
should be allowed.‖ McKane, 153 U.S. at 688; see also Arkin, supra, at 505.  Close to a 
century later, the Court affirmed its earlier view in McKane that a constitutional right to 
appeal does not exist. Arkin, supra, at 505 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)).  
The dissenters in Jones emphasized, however, that a right to appeal effectively existed 
because if the Court was presented with the issue, it would likely hold that ―a State must 
afford at least some opportunity for review of convictions‖; nonetheless, the dissenters 
continued, it was unlikely that such an issue would come before the Court, because ―a right 
to appeal is now universal for all significant criminal convictions.‖ Jones, 463 U.S. at 756–
57 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Arkin, supra, at 506.  Several years later, however, 
Justice Marshall expressed the view that only capital criminal cases are entitled to appellate 
review. Arkin, supra, at 506 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).  Indeed, former Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that 
―perhaps . . . the time has come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the [federal] 
district courts to the courts of appeals, and allow such review only when it is granted in the 
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While trial errors involving the erroneous admission or rejection of 
evidence did not automatically warrant setting aside a verdict and granting a 
new trial in English courts in the early nineteenth century, this position was 
rejected a few decades later with the introduction of the ―Exchequer rule.‖75  
The Exchequer rule, announced in Crease v. Barrett,76 was interpreted to 
allow even trivial errors to require a new trial.77  Subsequently, this 
interpretation of the Exchequer rule was accepted across English courts.78  
It was not until Parliament enacted a harmless error statute in the early 
twentieth century that the Exchequer rule lost much of its influence over 
judicial decision making.79 
The Exchequer rule also gained recognition in U.S. courts, where a 
similar tendency to reverse for even trivial errors existed if defendants were 
granted the opportunity to appeal.80  As Justice Story explained, ―the 
admission of illegal evidence . . . necessitates a reversal[.]‖81  The rule not 
only applied to trivial evidentiary errors, however, but also to a broad 
spectrum of trivial errors.  For example, a state appellate court in California 
reversed because of a typographical error in an indictment, which had 
charged the defendant with entry into a building with intent to commit 
 
discretion of a panel of the appellate court.‖ Id. at 508 (quoting Judith Resnik, Precluding 
Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605–06 (1985)).  Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the 
interests of ―lawyers‘ time, speedy disposition, and finality‖ in favor of this view. Id. 
(quoting Resnik, supra, at 605).  Relatedly, the right to counsel where a charge carries the 
possibility of a prison sentence was not mandated until 1963. See generally Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 75. John H. Wigmore, New Trials for Erroneous Rulings upon Evidence; A Practical 
Problem for American Justice, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (1903) (citing R. v. Ball, 
(1807) 168 Eng. Rep. 721; R. & R. 133).  For a further discussion of the line of cases leading 
up to Crease v. Barrett and subsequently endorsing it, see TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 7–9. 
 76. (1835) 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex.); 1 C.M. & R. 919. 
 77. Id.; see Wigmore, supra note 75, at 434–35. But see TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 5.  
Justice Traynor argues that Crease set out a standard similar to that announced in Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), despite the fact that more than a century passed before the 
latter case was decided. Id.  He explains that in Crease, the Court did not require automatic 
reversal due to the trial court‘s erroneous exclusion of evidence. Id.  Instead, the court 
reversed because, despite its ―strong‖ opinion in favor of the jury‘s verdict for the plaintiff, it 
could not say that the evidence would have no effect on the jury. Id. at 5–6.  The court, later 
in the opinion, used the phrase ―clear beyond all doubt.‖ Id. at 5 (citation omitted).  Justice 
Traynor believes that it was the subsequent application of Crease by the English courts that 
created a rigid rule requiring reversal for almost any trial error. See id. at 8–9. 
 78. Wigmore, supra note 75, at 435; see also Clark, supra note 25, at 83. 
 79. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4 (Eng.); see also Roger A. Fairfax, 
Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2008).  But see TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 11 (arguing that 
appellate judges nonetheless rarely dismissed appeals relating to trial errors).  The Criminal 
Appeal Act was in fact Parliament‘s second attempt at preventing automatic reversal by the 
courts. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, sch. 48 (Eng.).  In 
1873, it had passed the Judicature Act, which applied to civil cases, with little success. See 
TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 10–11; Fairfax, supra, at 2032. 
 80. Wigmore, supra note 75, at 435; see TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 13–14; see also 
supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 81. Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 380 (1894); see also Wigmore, supra note 75, at 
436 n.4. 
2014] SEARCHING FOR A HARMLESS ALTERNATIVE 307 
―larcey [sic].‖82  The defendant was not charged with the ―requisite 
felonious intent,‖83 merely because of this typographical error.  Such liberal 
determinations diminished the public‘s confidence in the judiciary and 
ultimately led to the legislature‘s enactment of statutes to ―rein in the 
courts.‖84 
2.   Introduction and Development of the Harmless Error Review Standard 
By the twentieth century, Congress had taken measures to ensure that 
―trial verdicts were not lightly disturbed,‖ particularly where appeal was 
based on ―mere technical errors.‖85  Congress passed legislation, which 
stated that only errors affecting ―substantial rights‖ required reversal.86  The 
judiciary, in turn, began to grapple with the interpretation of this legislation, 
introducing the harmless error review standard in 1946 in the landmark case 
of Kotteakos v. United States.87  In Kotteakos, the Court held that for an 
error to require reversal due to an effect on substantial rights, the error must 
have had ―substantial influence‖ on the verdict or left the reviewing court in 
―grave doubt‖ as to whether it did substantially influence the verdict.88  Put 
differently, the Court assessed the error to determine whether it ―had 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s 
 
 82. People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406, 407 (1880). 
 83. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing the holding in St. Clair). 
 84. Patton, supra note 73, at 102 (quoting Roy Wasson, The Appellate Process:  The 
Riddling of the Diguilio Harmless-Error Standard:  Whether Error “Contributed” to the 
Verdict, 5 BARRY L. REV. 57, 62–64 (2005)).  As an example of the level of public outcry to 
the rule of automatic reversal, Fairfax cites the creation of the ―Special Committee to 
Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in 
Litigation,‖ which included Justice Felix Frankfurter and President William H. Taft. See 
Fairfax, supra note 79, at 2033. 
 85. See Fairfax, supra note 79, at 2033 (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of 
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1006 (1973). 
 86. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 39, 62 Stat. 892, 992.  The federal harmless error statute in its current form reads:  
―On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment 
after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012).  As Justice Traynor emphasized, 
this language provides little guidance to appellate courts in determining when nontechnical 
errors are harmless. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 15.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure include Rules emulating this statute. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also Cooper, supra note 25, at 314–15 (describing the 
adoption of Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 52 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure following the enactment of the federal harmless error statute).  
Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) states that ―[a] party may claim error . . . only if 
the error affects a substantial right of the party.‖ FED. R. EVID. 103(a). 
 87. 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).  It has been stated that Kotteakos remains the 
―touchstone‖ decision for harmless error analysis. See Cooper, supra note 25, at 316 
(citations omitted).  The harmless error standard of review is applied in some form in every 
American jurisdiction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); GERSHMAN, 
supra note 71, at 490. 
 88. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765; see also GERSHMAN, supra note 71, at 491.  The Court 
later restated the test as whether the error ―undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.‖ Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (citation omitted). 
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verdict.‖89  Thus, Kotteakos required appellate courts ―to substitute 
judgment for automatic application of rules.‖90  In doing so, the Court 
sought to ensure that a defendant who had been fairly convicted did not 
have available the ―multiplicity of loopholes‖ stemming from trivial 
errors.91 
The standard introduced in Kotteakos applies to the evaluation of 
nonconstitutional errors92 and is different from the test generally applicable 
to constitutional trial errors.93  At the time of Kotteakos, cases were 
―reversed for constitutional error without a word as to the possibility that 
the error could be harmless.‖94 
a.   Harmless Error Standard Applied to Constitutional Errors 
In 1963, the Court in Fahy v. Connecticut95 stated that the harmless error 
standard may apply to constitutional errors, though the Court in Fahy 
expressly declined to consider whether the error at issue—the erroneous 
admission of evidence—was harmless.96  In Fahy, the Court instructed 
appellate courts to determine whether it was a ―reasonable possibility‖ that 
the error ―might have contributed to the conviction.‖97 
It was Fahy, however, that the Court relied on a few years later in 
Chapman v. California,98 when it held that constitutional errors of due 
process made in the context of a criminal case may be held harmless.99  The 
 
 89. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. 
 90. Id. at 760. 
 91. Id. 
 92. In Kotteakos, the Court noted that its holding likely did not apply to constitutional 
errors. Id. at 764–65 (stating that if the Court ascertained that ―the error did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps 
where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress‖); see 
also Cooper, supra note 25, at 317 (same). 
 93. See GERSHMAN, supra note 71, at 490–91.  Gershman provides some examples 
distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional errors.  Evidentiary rulings admitting or 
excluding evidence and misconduct by a prosecutor or judge are generally nonconstitutional, 
but errors may ―rise to the level of a constitutional violation‖ if a defendant is deprived of 
the right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause or not accorded a different constitutional 
right. Id. at 492. 
 94. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 55 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42–44 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 95. 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
 96. Id. at 86. 
 97. Id. at 86–87. 
 98. 386 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion) (stating that ―[w]e, therefore, do no more than 
adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case‖); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 37 (explaining 
Chapman‘s adherence to the test set forth in Fahy).  The Court elaborated, stating that 
―[t]here is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy . . . about ‗whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the evidence . . . might have contributed to the conviction‘ and 
requiring . . . constitutional error to [be proven] beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 24 (quoting Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86). 
 99. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (―We conclude that there may be some constitutional 
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they 
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the 
automatic reversal of the conviction.‖). 
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Court explained that such errors may be held harmless and thus disregarded 
if it appears ―beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained.‖100 
Only two years after Chapman, in Harrington v. California,101 the 
Court—holding itself out as applying the harmless error standard set out in 
Chapman—found a constitutional error harmless because of 
―overwhelming‖ evidence against the defendant.102  This application has 
been described as ―much different‖ and ―more prosecution-favorable‖ as 
compared with a harmless error analysis ―based on whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the 
conviction.‖103  The two standards remain in tension today, as the Court 
continues to waver in its application between them.104  It has been argued, 
however, that the trend seems to be in favor of the overwhelming evidence 
test.105 
Regardless of this apparent tension, over time the courts began to accept 
the application of the harmless error standard to constitutional errors.106  
Indeed, currently most federal constitutional errors may be held 
harmless.107 
Nonetheless, the Chapman Court emphasized that there remained certain 
constitutional errors, often referred to as structural errors, which could 
never be treated as harmless and so required automatic reversal.108  The 
Court provided three examples of such errors:  (1) admission of a coerced 
confession; (2) deprivation of the right to counsel at trial; and (3) lack of an 
impartial judge.109 
 
 100. Id. at 24; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (―[A]n 
otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently 
say . . . that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖).  The Court 
emphasized that the beneficiary of the error bears the burden of proving that there was no 
injury. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL 
COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 88 (Thomson/West ed. 2007).  This is in contrast to 
nonconstitutional errors, for which the defendant bears the burden of proving harmfulness. 
See GERSHMAN, supra note 71, at 493 (citations omitted). 
 101. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
 102. Id. at 254. 
 103. David McCord, The “Trial”/“Structural” Error Dichotomy:  Erroneous, and Not 
Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1406–07 (1997). 
 104. See id.; see also Fairfax, supra note 79, at 2037. 
 105. McCord, supra note 103, at 1406–07; see also Fairfax, supra note 79, at 2037. 
 106. EDWARDS, supra note 100, at 88. 
 107. Id.; see also GERSHMAN, supra note 71, at 493 (noting that while initially a finding 
of harmless constitutional error was the exception, it has become more common as courts 
have warmed to its application).  For examples of constitutional errors that are per se 
reversible, see infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 108. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
 109. See id. at 23 & n.8 (citations omitted).  The Court later rejected the view that the 
admission of a coerced confession required automatic reversal, finding that it was not a 
structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (finding admission of 
an involuntary confession to be a ―classic ‗trial error‘‖); see also McCord, supra note 103, at 
1411 (explaining the same). 
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Approximately twenty-five years after Chapman, the Court in Arizona v. 
Fulminante110 attempted to refine the test for determining whether 
constitutional error is subject to harmless error review, basing the 
distinction on whether the error was a trial error or structural error.111  The 
Court explained that a trial error is able to ―be quantitatively assessed in the 
context of other evidence,‖ whereas a structural error ―affect[s] the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself.‖112  Armed with this standard, the Court has only 
deemed a handful of errors reversible per se since Fulimante.113  Such 
errors include a finding of ―fundamental unfairness‖ and where the effect of 
a violation is unascertainable.114 
b.   Harmless Error Standard Applied on Direct and Collateral Review 
Aside from analyzing error differently based on whether it is 
constitutional or nonconstitutional, the Court‘s analysis has also differed 
between cases on direct and collateral review.115 
While direct review is the principle means of challenging a conviction, 
collateral review, such as via federal habeas proceedings,116 is ―secondary 
and limited,‖ as it allows for an ―extraordinary remedy.‖117  As such, ―an 
error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a 
 
 110. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 111. Id. at 307–08. 
 112. Id. at 308, 310.  ―[T]he term ‗structural error‘ does not refer to constitutional 
structure; instead, it corresponds to the ‗infrastructure‘ within which a criminal case is tried. 
Only those constitutional errors that transcend[] the criminal process, and implicate that trial 
infrastructure or framework, according to Fulminante, were reversible per se.‖ Fairfax, supra 
note 79, at 2038 (citation omitted). 
 113. ―A full decade-and-a-half after Fulminante‘s inventory of those structural 
constitutional errors subject to automatic reversal, only two additions—a defective 
reasonable doubt instruction and deprivation of counsel of one‘s choice—have been made.‖ 
Fairfax, supra note 79 at 2039 (citations omitted).  Moreover, between Chapman and 
Fulminante, the Court only found five constitutional errors to require automatic reversal:  
―abridgment of the right to self-representation; abridgment of the right to a public trial; 
unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant‘s race from a grand jury; failure to assure 
an impartial jury in a capital case; and appointment of an interested party‘s attorney as 
prosecutor for contempt charges.‖ See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310; McCord, supra note 
103, at 1406 (citations omitted).  For a further explanation, see supra note 112. 
 114. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006). 
 115. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). 
 116. A writ of habeas corpus, which is provided for state prisoners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, asks a federal court to review whether a prisoner‘s detention is unlawful. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:  HABEAS CORPUS 1 
(2d ed. 2003).  A habeas petition is a rare vehicle through which a federal court can review a 
state court decision, which is no longer subject to review. See YACKLE, supra, at 161–64. 
 117. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). 
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collateral attack on a final judgment.‖118  This result protects the state‘s 
interest in preserving the finality of its judgments.119 
Accordingly, with respect to federal habeas corpus proceedings, which 
involve collateral review of a criminal conviction within the context of a 
civil trial, the Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson120 held that the Kotteakos 
standard,121 rather than the Chapman standard, should be used to assess 
nonstructural constitutional errors.122  Thus, the Court instructed that the 
harmless error test applied determines whether the error has a ―substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict.‖123  The 
Court explained that Kotteakos‘s ―less onerous‖ standard ―promotes the 
considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence‖ and ―is better tailored 
to the nature and purpose of collateral review.‖124 
c.   Empirical Studies Examining the Harmless Error Standard’s 
Effect on Judgments 
While the distinction between the Chapman and Kotteakos standards is 
important, as the harmless error test applied may significantly affect 
whether an error is deemed harmless,125 it is not wholly clear what impact 
this has had in practice.  Although reversal rates on the whole at the federal 
appellate level have decreased significantly since 1960, commentators have 
cited a number of possible reasons for this trend.126  One scholar has 
expressed the view that this conclusion could be consistent with the theory 
 
 118. Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).  The Court 
further noted that in the past it had applied different standards to habeas proceedings than 
would be applied on direct review, such as when it decides whether a constitutional decision 
should apply retroactively to a criminal defendant. Id. 
 119. Id. at 635.  The Court elaborated that not only would application of the Chapman 
standard in this context undermine the states‘ interest in finality and infringe upon their 
sovereignty with respect to criminal matters but granting relief in a habeas proceeding due to 
a ―reasonable possibility‖ that the trial error affected the verdict directly conflicts with ―the 
historic meaning of habeas corpus—to afford relief to those whom society has ‗grievously 
wronged.‘‖ Id. at 637 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
 120. 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
 121. Id. at 637–38. 
 122. Id.; see also EDWARDS, supra note 100, at 82. 
 123. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 
(1946)). 
 124. Id.  In Brecht, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a first-degree murder 
conviction after determining that, under Chapman, though the prosecution‘s use of the 
defendant‘s post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes was impermissible, the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.  By the time Brecht reached the Supreme 
Court, five prior courts had ruled on this issue. Id. at 636.  The Court affirmed the conviction 
of the defendant, finding that the Seventh Circuit had properly applied the Kotteakos 
standard and, based on the merits, the error did not have a substantial and injurious influence 
on the conviction. See id. at 638. 
 125. Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:  
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1341–52 (1994). 
 126. Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization:  The Origins and 
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 
659, 675 (2007) (citing Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism:  Models of 
Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 135 n.42 (2005)). 
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that judges have found less error in more recent years because they have 
―less time to look for [it].‖127  Judge Posner has also expressed this view, 
stating:  ―the less time an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it 
is simply to affirm the district court.‖128  Further, he noted that ―affirmance 
[is] the easy way out.‖129  Judge Posner also attributed lower reversal rates 
to the fact that there are simply proportionately fewer ―hard‖ cases than 
there once were.130   
Studies also show that reversal rates vary by circuit and state, which 
indicates that other factors, such as the ideology of the panel, may be 
relevant.131  Similarly, one scholar has noted that lower reversal rates could 
indicate a ―level of affinity‖ between judges on the circuit and district 
courts.132  The role of the government in proceedings as it relates to a 
defendant‘s rights can also have an impact; one commentator recently 
endorsed the view that ―the American prosecutor enjoys an independence 
and discretionary privileges unmatched in the world.‖133  This consideration 
is particularly acute where a defendant proceeds postconviction without the 
assistance of counsel.134 
 
 127. See id. at 675 (quoting Oldfather, supra note 126, at 136). 
 128. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 74–75 (2d 
ed. 1996); see also Lindquist, supra note 126, at 675–76 (discussing Judge Posner‘s views 
and judges‘ caseloads). 
 129. POSNER, supra note 128, at 75; see also Lindquist, supra note 126, at 676 (discussing 
Judge Posner‘s views and judges‘ caseloads). 
 130. POSNER, supra note 128, at 75. 
 131. See Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy:  Reversals and the Behavior 
of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 163, 176–78 (2006) (finding a 17 
percent reversal rate in the Eleventh Circuit, but a 69 percent reversal rate in the D.C. Circuit 
between 1980 and 2002); see also 24 GEORGE T. PATTON, INDIANA PRACTICE APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE § 5.1 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008) (discussing reversal rates on the state level); 
Lindquist, supra note 126, at 702 (discussing diversities in panel ideologies). 
 132. See Lindquist, supra note 126, at 676.  Lindquist provides ideological similarity, 
lenient review standards, and cohesive circuit law as motivations for lower reversal rates. Id.  
She also notes that the differences in reversal rates across circuits may be attributable to 
circuit norms regarding the level of deference to district courts with respect to findings of 
fact. Id.  Lindquist cites the First and Second Circuits as circuits where the probability of 
reversal has recently significantly decreased. See id. 
 133. See Michael Edmund O‘Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 659, 660 (2010) (quoting Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea 
Bargaining:  Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 
CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 568 (1984) (citation omitted)); see also CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & 
LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 189 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining that Rule 404(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence ―gives a criminal defendant some counterweight against the 
strong investigative and prosecutorial resources of the government‖). 
 134. Christopher T. Robertson, Contingent Compensation of Post-Conviction Counsel:  A 
Modest Proposal to Identify Meritorious Claims and Reduce Wasteful Government 
Spending, 64 ME. L. REV. 513, 519 (2012).  Robertson elaborates:  ―Proceeding [without 
counsel] is particularly dangerous because state [and federal] post-conviction procedures are 
generally marked by strict pleading requirements, inflexible filing deadlines, elaborate 
preclusion doctrines, and other technical pitfalls that cannot practicably be navigated without 
highly skilled counsel.‖ Id. (quoting Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment 
and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
339, 354 (2006)). 
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But the harmless error standard specifically has also affected the decrease 
in reversal rates.135  The Court has emphasized that the harmless error 
standard ―promotes public respect . . . by focusing on the underlying 
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 
immaterial error‖136 and argues it is a defense against litigants‘ abuse of the 
process and, more generally, ensures public faith in the judicial process.137 
3.   The Harmless Error Standard as Applied 
to Alternative Theory Jury Instructions 
The current divergence among the circuits in their application of the 
harmless error standard to alternative theory errors did not materialize until 
after Hegdpeth, in particular because alternative theory errors were not 
originally subjected to harmless error review.  In the earlier Supreme Court 
case of Stromberg v. California,138 the Court applied a much stricter test, 
holding that it was a constitutional error to instruct a jury on alternative 
theories of guilt, one of which was legally invalid, and return a general 
verdict that may have relied on the legally invalid theory.139  At that time, 
as discussed above,140 a constitutional error warranted automatic reversal of 
the conviction.141 
 
 135. See generally Lindquist, supra note 126, at 676; Mitchell, supra note 125, at 1341–
52.  Notably, a study providing empirical information about habeas corpus motions filed by 
state prisoners in federal district courts under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 found that only 4 out of 267 capital cases and 4 out of 2384 noncapital cases 
held an error not harmless. See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 50, 52, 63 (2007), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.  For an explanation of 
habeas proceedings, see Devon Lash, Note, Giving Meaning to “Meaningful Enough”:  Why 
Trevino Requires New Counsel on Appeal, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1862–63 (2014). 
 136. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
 137. TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 50. 
 138. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 139. Id. at 367–68; see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).  In Stromberg, 
the defendant, a member of the Young Communist League (an affiliate of the Communist 
Party), had been convicted in state court for displaying a red flag in a public place in 
violation of California‘s Penal Code. See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 361–62.  The statute at 
issue consisted of three purposes, which the trial court treated disjunctively. Id. at 364–65.  
The trial court instructed the jury that it could find in favor of the government if any one 
purpose was met. Id. at 386.  Consequently, because the defendant had been convicted 
pursuant to a general verdict, the Court held that the prosecution needed to show that each 
clause within the statute was valid in order to uphold the conviction. See id. at 365.  The 
Court found the first clause of the statute was ambiguous and indefinite, as it could 
conceivably encompass conduct that California ―could not constitutionally prohibit.‖ Id. at 
369.  Thus, it ultimately deemed the statute unconstitutional because it violated the 
defendant‘s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.  The Court vacated the defendant‘s 
conviction. Id. 
 140. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 141. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60 (2008) (per curiam) (discussing how 
Stromberg was decided at a time when constitutional errors could not be held harmless).  
While most federal constitutional errors can be held harmless, there are two primary 
exceptions:  structural errors and errors involving constitutional rights that require a 
defendant to demonstrate harm. See EDWARDS, supra note 100, at 88 (citing United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 
(1995)). 
314 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Following Chapman, which confirmed that constitutional errors could be 
subjected to harmless error review, however, the Court concluded in a 
series of cases that instructional error was not structural error requiring 
automatic reversal but instead a trial error subject to harmless error 
review.142  For example, in Neder v. United States,143 the Court held that 
the omission of an element of the relevant offense in a jury instruction was 
subject to harmless error review144 and stated that to determine whether an 
error was harmless, a reviewing court must ask ―whether the record 
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with 
respect to the omitted element.‖145  In providing this standard, the Court 
relied significantly upon matters of public policy,146 expressing its view 
that ―where an omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence,‖ 
applying harmless error review allows for ―an appropriate balance between 
‗society‘s interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method by which 
decisions of guilt are made.‘‖147  The Court described this balance in 
further detail.  On the one hand, the Court noted the importance of a fair 
trial, which ―promotes public respect for the criminal process.‖148  On the 
other hand, it highlighted the importance of not becoming a slave to 
procedure, explaining that jury trials are intended ―to guard against a spirit 
of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers‖ in a broad sense.149  Thus, 
the Court came to the conclusion that ―where a defendant did not, and 
apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element‖—
such as in the instant case—―answering the question whether the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error does not fundamentally 
undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee.‖150 
It was against this backdrop that the Court in 2008 decided Hedgpeth v. 
Pulido.151  In Pulido, the Court held that a general verdict rendered by a 
jury following instruction on alternative theories of guilt, one of which was 
 
 142. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 60.  Other than Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the 
Court also cited the following examples:  Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (based on the 
misstatement of an element of an offense) and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (based on 
erroneous burden-shifting as to an element of an offense). Id. at 60–61. 
 143. 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 144. Id. at 4.  In Neder, the defendant was charged with fraud, including tax fraud, under 
a number of federal criminal statutes for activities in connection with fraudulently obtaining 
bank loans. Id.  These statutes include:  18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343–44 and 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7206(1). Id. at 6.  The trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that to convict the 
defendant of the tax fraud offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false 
statements made. Id.  The Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that this error was subject 
to harmless error analysis, finding that ―an instruction that omits an element of the offense 
does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.‖ Id. at 7, 9; cf. Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997) (―The failure to submit materiality to the 
jury . . . can just as easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on an element of 
the offense . . . an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis . . . .‖). 
 145. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. 
 146. See id. at 18–19. 
 147. Id. at 3 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 86 (1983) (plurality opinion)). 
 148. Id. at 18–19 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
 149. Id. at 19 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995)). 
 150. Id. at 18–19. 
 151. 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam). 
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invalid, may amount to a harmless error.152  The Court stated that to 
determine whether an erroneous instruction is harmless on collateral review, 
the reviewing court should ask ―whether the flaw in the instructions ‗had 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s 
verdict.‘‖153  The Court elaborated that a reviewing court need not require 
―absolute certainty‖ that the jury relied on the valid ground.154 
While the Court did not further elaborate on how to apply this 
standard,155 it explicitly rejected reliance on an earlier line of cases, 
beginning with Stromberg, which had required automatic reversal for 
constitutional error in the case of an erroneous jury instruction.156  The 
Court emphasized that a substantial and injurious effect should not be 
presumed because a general verdict form157 had been used.158 
In 2010, the Court in Skilling v. United States clarified that the harmless 
error review standard set out in Pulido, which had been decided on 
collateral review, applied equally to cases on direct appeal.159  Accordingly, 
alternative theory jury instruction errors, though considered constitutional 
in character, may be subjected to a standard reserved primarily for 
nonconstitutional errors.160 
Moreover, the Skilling decision is representative of the cases that have 
since led to divergent interpretations and applications by circuit courts 
concerning alternative theory errors.  In Skilling, the jury delivered a 
general verdict finding the former CEO of Enron Corporation guilty after it 
was provided with instructions that allowed for conviction of conspiracy for 
misleading investors by fraudulently manipulating Enron‘s financial 
statements under a number of theories, including securities fraud and honest 
services fraud.161  The defendant appealed, and the Court eventually 
granted certiorari.162  In its review, the Court significantly narrowed the 
scope of honest services fraud, holding that the statute criminalizes only 
bribery and kickbacks, thus eliminating the statute‘s applicability to the 
 
 152. Id. at 58. 
 153. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 
 154. Id. at 58, 62 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623).  In Pulido, the jury had been 
instructed that the defendant could be found guilty of felony murder if the defendant had the 
intent to aid and abet in the underlying felony, either before or after the murder had occurred. 
Id. at 59.  The jury convicted the defendant of felony murder pursuant to a general verdict. 
Id.  The California Supreme Court held that under state law the theory allowing for 
conviction based on the intent formed after the murder was invalid, and accordingly, that 
portion of the instruction was too. Id.  Nonetheless, it found the error harmless. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Court did not provide guidance on applying this standard in this 
context); Babb v. Lozowsky, 719 F.3d 1019, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013) (same), overruled on other 
grounds by Moore v. Helling, No. 12-15795, 2014 WL 3973407 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014). 
 156. See Pulido, 555 U.S. at 60. 
 157. For a discussion on the general verdict form, see supra Part I.A.2. 
 158. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 62. 
 159. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 464 n.46 (2010).  For a closer review of 
Skilling, see infra Part II.A. 
 160. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 161. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481, 488 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 162. See id. at 481. 
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defendant‘s case.163  The Court did not reverse any of the defendant‘s 
convictions but remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether 
the error in the honest services instruction was harmless.164  The Fifth 
Circuit‘s approach, which is discussed in more detail below,165 reveals the 
stark contrast between its line of analysis and that seemingly followed by 
the circuits placing a heavier burden on the government.166 
II.   ALTERNATIVE THEORIES:  THE CIRCUITS‘ DIVERGING APPLICATIONS 
OF THE HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW STANDARD 
TO ALTERNATIVE THEORY ERRORS 
The circuit courts are divided in their application of the harmless error 
review standard to alternative theory errors.  Since Pulido, some courts 
have adjusted the test that they apply, allowing for a lesser burden on the 
government to sustain a conviction, while others have seemed to continue 
to follow an approach that harkens back to the Stromberg line of cases.  
This section will lay out in detail the varying approaches of the circuit 
courts. 
A.   Circuits Maintaining a Heavy Burden 
on the Government to Defend Harmlessness 
This section examines circuit court decisions from the Tenth, Second, 
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits that have continued post-Pulido to place a 
heavy burden on the government to defend harmlessness. 
 
 163. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408; see also Skilling, 638 F.3d at 481.  The Court made this 
decision in response to Skilling‘s argument that the honest services fraud statute (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346) was unconstitutionally vague. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 398–99. 
 164. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 398–99. 
 165. See infra Part II.B. 
 166. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit‘s approach sheds light on the Supreme Court‘s 
additional distinction between honest services fraud and securities fraud.  The government 
had introduced evidence at trial that the defendant had made misleading statements to 
Enron‘s board of directors, some of which were not communicated to the public. See 
Skilling, 638 F.3d at 484 n.4.  As such, the court opined, ―[T]his evidence would prove 
honest-services fraud,‖ which no longer applied to the defendant, ―but not securities fraud,‖ 
which was the valid remaining theory for the defendant‘s conspiracy charge. See id. 
(emphasis added).  The evidence would not prove securities fraud because the Court‘s 
standard set out in Basic Inc. v. Levinson applies a semi-strong fraud-on-the-market theory 
(that is based on the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis), which stands for the proposition 
that all publicly available information (including public material misrepresentations) are 
reflected in the market price of shares. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) 
(―An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the 
integrity of that price.  Because most publicly available information is reflected in market 
price, an investor‘s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be 
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.‖); see also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014) (upholding Basic‘s fraud-on-the-market 
presumption while allowing for a rebuttal of this presumption at the class-certification 
stage); cf. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 673 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis).  
The strong form theorizes that share prices reflect all past information, such that no public 
disclosure is required. See ALLEN ET AL., supra, at 673. 
2014] SEARCHING FOR A HARMLESS ALTERNATIVE 317 
1.   Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit has held that, where one ground for conviction is 
invalid, the only way that a verdict may be sustained is if it is possible to 
determine that the jury relied on the valid ground or ―necessarily made the 
findings required to support a conviction on the valid ground.‖167 
In United States v. McKye,168 a jury convicted the defendant of both 
securities fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering.169  The 
securities fraud statute under which the defendant was charged required that 
the fraud involve a ―security.‖170  The district court judge had instructed the 
jury that, as a matter of law, all notes were securities under the statute171 
(but not, however, that the investment notes at issue—known as ―Premium 
60 Accounts‖—were themselves notes).172  The defendant appealed, 
arguing that his convictions could not stand because the jury had been 
erroneously instructed that, as a matter of law, the term security includes a 
note.173  The Tenth Circuit agreed with the defendant that whether a note is 
a security is a mixed question of fact and law under Supreme Court 
precedent.174  The Tenth Circuit found that because the government was 
required to prove as an element of its case that the notes at issue were 
securities, the district court had erred in its instruction.175 
While the government argued that the record contained ―ample facts‖ 
from which the jury could have made the determination that the notes at 
issue were securities, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the government did 
not provide even one citation to the record to support its argument.176  
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found that this error required reversal 
because the government had failed to show that it was harmless beyond a 
 
 167. United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104, 1110 n.6 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).  
The McKye majority relied on United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 2007), and 
United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), which were decided prior to Pulido, as noted 
by Chief Judge Briscoe in her concurrence. Id. at 1112 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
 168. 734 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 169. Id. at 1105 (majority opinion). 
 170. The defendant was charged with eight counts of securities fraud under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b) and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(h). Id. 
 171. Id. at 1107. 
 172. Id. at 1110. 
 173. Id. at 1105. 
 174. Id. at 1110.  The court relied on United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), Reves 
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), and McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2002), 
to make this determination. Id. at 1108–10. 
 175. Id. at 1110. 
 176. Id.  The Tenth Circuit elaborated that while the evidence may exist in the record, ―it 
is not the responsibility of this court to comb the record to find it.‖ Id. at 1110–11; see also 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 34, McKye, 734 F.3d 1104 (No. 12 Cr. 06108) (―The 
government presented ample facts from which the jury could determine whether or not the 
defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.  And from that, the jury could also determine whether or not the instruments used 
properly fell within that definition.‖ (internal citations omitted)). 
318 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
reasonable doubt.177  Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that 
the government did not meet its burden of showing that the conviction was 
―uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.‖178 
2.   Second Circuit 
Following the Supreme Court‘s holding in Skilling, which, as discussed 
above,179 narrowed the scope of honest services fraud to encompass only 
mail fraud prosecutions involving bribery or kickbacks, the Second Circuit 
stated that to determine whether a Skilling error is harmless, it looks to see 
whether a ―reasonable probability‖ exists that the error in the instructions 
―affected the outcome of the trial.‖180 
A court in the Southern District of New York applied this holding in 
United States v. Post,181 finding that a Skilling instruction error was not 
harmless.182  In Post, the defendants were each charged with one count of 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud or honest services fraud and one count of 
substantive mail fraud or honest services fraud.183  The activities underlying 
these charges involved three different but related fraudulent schemes 
 
 177. McKye, 734 F.3d at 1110 (citing United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1307 n.7 
(10th Cir. 2007)). 
 178. Id. (quoting Holly, 488 F.3d at 1307).  Judge Briscoe wrote separately solely to 
―voice [her] concern‖ that the harmless error standard of review expressed in Holly may be 
inconsistent with Pulido. Id. at 1111 (Briscoe, J., concurring).  She emphasized that Holly 
relied on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), which Pulido explicitly repudiated, 
as it was decided before the Supreme Court had held that constitutional errors may be 
subjected to harmless error review. Id. at 1112.  She further explained that she concurred in 
judgment because she was bound by the circuit‘s precedent and the government did not 
attempt to establish that the jury verdict had rested on the valid theory. Id. at 1114. 
 179. See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text.  This type of error is often referred 
to as Skilling error. 
 180. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010); see also United States v. Post, 
950 F. Supp. 2d 519, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); cf. United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 140 (2d 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 309 (2013) (finding an alternative instruction error 
harmless where the Second Circuit had ―no doubt that, had the jury been properly instructed, 
it would have found the defendants guilty of honest services wire fraud based on their 
scheme of concealed bribery,‖ because it had relied on the same facts in convicting the 
defendants pursuant to the federal commercial bribery statutes); United States v. Botti, 711 
F.3d 299, 311 (2d Cir. 2013) (conviction for honest services affirmed despite Skilling error—
though not alternative instruction error—where ―bribery was the only theory that the 
evidence would support and the only theory that the Government argued at trial‖).  Also in 
Botti, the Second Circuit stated that it ―has reversed in cases . . . where the Government 
argued a non-bribery or -kickback scheme theory of honest services mail fraud, or where the 
Government intertwined an alternative theory with a bribery or kickback scheme.‖ Botti, 711 
F.3d at 311 (emphasis added). 
 181. 950 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 182. Id. at 538. 
 183. Id. at 523.  The specific language in the indictment framed the conspiracy charge as 
an intent ―to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to deprive the City . . . and its 
citizens of their intangible right to the honest services of [defendant] and to deprive the 
City . . . [and] its citizens . . . of money and property‖ by, among other things, concealing the 
personal and financial relationship between the defendants. Id. (citation omitted).  The 
indictment framed the substantive mail fraud count to encompass the use of the mail to carry 
out the conspiracy scheme. Id.  The jury instructions tracked the language in the indictment. 
Id. at 525. 
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committed by the two defendants, who had a close personal and financial 
relationship.184  Under the first scheme, it was alleged that defendant Post, 
through her official position in two agencies that received federal funding, 
had helped defendant Charles receive that same funding.185  Charles 
submitted proposals to the city for review, and Post would then recommend 
the city accept the proposals.186  Charles‘s company, however, was only a 
front with no experience in the relevant industry.187  Throughout this 
scheme, the defendants concealed their personal relationship.188  The 
second scheme involved Post recommending that an entity owned by 
Charles receive a loan; once Charles‘s entity received the loan, it did not 
make interest payments on the loan for a time, though Post did not record 
this.189  The third scheme involved Post‘s approval of federal funds to 
entities controlled by Charles, again without disclosure of their personal 
relationship.190  The jury convicted both defendants on each count by 
general verdict.191  Following the Supreme Court‘s holding in Skilling,192 
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss their conspiracy and substantive 
mail fraud convictions.193  They argued that dismissal of the convictions 
was proper because the jury may have relied on the erroneous honest 
services fraud theory instruction.194  Specifically, the defendants noted that 
the jury instruction allowed the jury to convict the defendants of mail fraud 
―based on either its finding of traditional pecuniary fraud or its finding of 
honest services fraud.‖195 
The court agreed that the honest services fraud jury instruction was 
erroneous, and citing Pulido, proceeded to apply harmless error review.196  
Notably, the government argued that the instruction error was harmless 
because of the ―overwhelming‖ evidence of traditional pecuniary fraud 
presented to the jury at trial.197  The court rejected this argument as 
 
 184. Id. at 523. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 522, 526.  The defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346, and 
1349. Id. at 522. 
 192. See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)).  The defendants‘ 
case was still pending because the district court had granted the defendants‘ request to delay 
sentencing until after certain Supreme Court cases, including Skilling, were decided. Id. at 
527.  The court noted that the defendants‘ motion alleged more than simply a defect in the 
indictment, which is encompassed by Rule 12(b)(3)(B), but nonetheless decided to consider 
the issue because ―an indictment‘s defects can affect a defendant‘s substantive rights at 
trial.‖ Id. at 528 (citations omitted). 
 194. Id. at 527. 
 195. Id. at 528. 
 196. Id. at 529.  The court also cited Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), for this 
proposition, which United States v. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam), had 
endorsed. Id. 
 197. Id. at 533. 
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insufficient to sustain the defendants‘ convictions.198  The court emphasized 
that in its assessment it looked to see not whether ―in a trial that occurred 
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error.‖199  Instead, the court found the error was not 
harmless.200 
In conducting its analysis, the court compared cases that had ordered 
reversal due to Skilling error with those that had instead found the error 
harmless.201  For example, in Martignoni v. United States,202 a court in the 
Southern District of New York found that a Skilling error was not 
harmless.203  The court came to this conclusion largely because the honest 
services theory had been the ―central feature‖ of the relevant counts, and so 
it was clear that the court was unable to establish under which theory the 
jury had convicted the defendant.204  Martignoni is an example of cases that 
are deemed not harmless because ―the evidence that would go to a valid 
conviction was not overwhelming‖ and ―the government repeatedly urged 
the jury to convict purely on the basis of a conflict-of-interest theory.‖205 
In contrast, the court cited a Third Circuit case, United States v. 
Andrews,206 as representative of a harmless Skilling error.207  In Andrews, 
despite an invalid honest services theory instruction, the Third Circuit 
determined that the error was harmless because that theory was incidental to 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 534 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).  The court 
continued, explaining that if ―overwhelming proof that a defendant committed some valid 
crime was alone sufficient‖ to amount to a harmless instructional error, ―then so long as the 
Government presents overwhelming evidence for conviction of some crime, a conviction 
could stand no matter how pervasively incorrect instructions suffused the proceedings and 
how strongly the Government stressed the incorrect theory in its opening and closing 
statements.‖ Id. 
 200. Id. at 533, 541. 
 201. See id. at 534–35. 
 202. No. 10-CV-6671, 2011 WL 4834217 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011). 
 203. See id. at *10.  The Post court cited other similar cases in which the evidence was 
not overwhelming and where the government urged the jury to convict purely on the basis of 
a conflict-of-interest theory. See Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (citing United States v. 
Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 136 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733, 740–41 
(2d Cir. 2011)). 
 204. See Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (quoting Martignoni, 2011 WL 4834217, at *7, 
*10). 
 205. See id. (citing Mahaffy, 693 F.3d at 136, and Bruno, 661 F.3d at 740–41, as other 
such cases). 
 206. 681 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2012).  Chief Judge Briscoe‘s concurrence in United States v. 
McKye also cites United States v. Andrews as a comparison to the Fifth Circuit‘s approach in 
United States v. Skilling. See United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(Briscoe, J., concurring) (―Where there is a clear alternative theory of guilt, supported by 
overwhelming evidence, a defendant likely cannot show that an instruction permitting the 
jury to convict on an improper basis was not harmless error.‖ (quoting Andrews, 681 F.3d at 
521)). 
 207. Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37. 
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the case, and the more prominent pecuniary fraud theory did not contain an 
error.208 
The Post court determined that the instant case ―seem[ed] to fall 
somewhere in between the center of gravity of each group of cases.‖209  
Engaging in a ―multi-factor inquiry,‖210 the court found the error to be not 
harmless because the theory involving the erroneous instruction pervaded 
through the case more significantly than in cases where an error was 
deemed harmless.211 
The court ultimately concluded that, based on evidence presented to the 
jury—such as the fact that the government mentioned the honest services 
theory in its closing argument and the fact that the jury was told it could 
convict under an honest services fraud theory and not a pecuniary fraud 
theory—it could not find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.212 
3.   Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit has also maintained a heavier burden on the 
government to demonstrate that an error is harmless.  The Fourth Circuit 
has stated that it would affirm a conviction only if ―the evidence that the 
jury necessarily credited in order to convict the defendant under the 
instructions given . . . is such that the jury must have convicted the 
defendant on the legally adequate ground in addition to or instead of the 
legally inadequate ground.‖213 
In Bereano v. United States,214 the defendant (a lawyer and lobbyist) was 
convicted of mail fraud for defrauding his lobbying clients under theories of 
both honest services fraud and pecuniary fraud.215  The defendant ran a 
fraudulent billing scheme, where he would funnel cash through his law firm 
 
 208. Andrews, 681 F.3d at 520, 525–26; see also Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 537 
(characterizing the invalid honest services theory in Andrews as ―merely incidental‖).  The 
Third Circuit emphasized that it based the determination on ―the context in which the 
instruction was provided and the other evidence presented at trial.‖ Andrews, 681 F.3d at 
522. 
 209. Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
 210. Id. at 534. 
 211. Id. at 537.  The court also rejected the government‘s argument that the theories 
overlapped entirely. Id. at 531, 541 (―Ultimately, then, because the Government opted to 
articulate two overlapping but distinct theories of fraud, it may not now say that conviction 
on an honest services fraud theory was the exact same as conviction on the money or 
property fraud theory.‖). 
 212. Id. at 538 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)). 
 213. Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568, 578 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 
v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 361 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 648 (2012)). 
 214. 706 F.3d 568, 578 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 215. Id. at 570.  The defendant had been charged with eight counts of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, which involved two separate theories of mail 
fraud. Id.  Section 1341 criminalizes using mail for the purpose of executing ―any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses,‖ while § 1346 is defined more broadly to include ―a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.‖ See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2012); 
Bereano, 706 F.3d at 570 & n.2. 
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and use it to contribute to various political candidates rather than for the 
ostensible purpose of his law firm operations.216  For example, the 
defendant would issue a check to a law firm employee, seemingly for office 
purposes, and then have that employee deliver the proceeds of the check to 
him.217  The proceeds would ultimately be made into a political 
contribution.218  The defendant would then falsely bill a lobbying client for 
items such as ―legislative entertainment‖ and thereby funnel the cash back 
into his law firm.219 
Following the Supreme Court‘s holding in Skilling, which narrowed the 
scope of honest services fraud to encompass only mail fraud prosecutions 
involving bribery or kickbacks,220 the defendant petitioned for a writ of 
coram nobis221 to vacate his sentence.222  The district court denied the 
defendant‘s petition, though the court admitted the error with respect to the 
honest services fraud conviction because the defendant‘s indictment had not 
contained allegations of bribery or kickbacks.223  The court upheld the 
conviction because it determined that the pecuniary fraud theory under 
which the defendant had also been charged was unaffected by the Supreme 
Court‘s honest services fraud decision and so the conviction remained 
intact.224  The court explained that the defendant was nonetheless guilty 
under the pecuniary fraud theory because he had used the mail to defraud 
his lobbying clients of their money and property, as required under 18 
U.S.C. § 1341.225  The court agreed with the government that the defendant 
could not have been convicted of the mail fraud charges without the jury 
necessarily finding the defendant guilty under the pecuniary fraud theory, 
and as such, the court determined that the honest services theory error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.226 
The Fourth Circuit agreed and affirmed the defendant‘s conviction 
because it found that a reasonable jury could not both acquit the defendant 
of a form of pecuniary fraud and convict him of honest services fraud, 
where both frauds related to the same false billing scheme.227  It endorsed 
 
 216. Bereano, 706 F.3d at 570. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 569; see also supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text (discussing Skilling 
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 358 (2010)). 
 221. A writ of coram nobis is brought as a means to challenge an alleged error of fact that 
does not appear in the record. See Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Application of Civil or 
Criminal Procedural Rules in Federal Court Proceeding on Motion in Nature of Writ of 
Error Coram Nobis, 53 A.L.R. FED. 762 (1981). 
 222. Bereano, 706 F.3d at 570. 
 223. Id. at 569, 575. 
 224. Id. at 569. 
 225. Id. at 575. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 579.  While acknowledging that an alternative theory error is subject to 
harmless error review, the Fourth Circuit relied on Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
(1957), in its determination of whether the error was harmless. Id. at 577.  Yates instructs 
that a general verdict of guilty should be set aside if it rests on two alternative theories, one 
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the district court‘s rationale that such a different result would be 
inconsistent because a conviction stemming from an honest services fraud 
charge ―necessarily acknowledges that the jury accepts . . . that [the 
defendant] knowingly took advantage of his client[s‘] trust by sending them 
false bills.‖228  Thus, ―the jury also necessarily accepted that [the 
defendant] knowingly obtained his clients‘ money by false pretenses,‖ 
which the Fourth Circuit reasoned ―equates to a conviction for pecuniary 
fraud.‖229 
4.   Seventh Circuit 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has stated that it would deem an error 
harmless only if ―the trial evidence was such that the jury must have 
convicted the petitioners on both theories.‖230 
In Sorich v. United States,231 the defendant, an employee in Chicago 
Mayor‘s Office, had been convicted of mail fraud under both theories of 
honest services fraud and pecuniary fraud.232  The activities underlying his 
conviction involved engaging in a fraudulent scheme to ensure that certain 
political workers and employees gained employment with the City of 
Chicago, despite a court order that forbade awarding city jobs for political 
reasons.233 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the defendant‘s conviction, rejecting his 
argument that the district court‘s erroneous honest services fraud theory 
required reversal.234  Instead, the Seventh Circuit determined that the error 
had no ―substantial and injurious effect or influence‖ in determining the 
jury‘s verdict,235 because the court found that the theories of fraud under 
which the defendant was charged were ―coextensive‖ and premised on a 
 
of which is invalid, and it is ―impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.‖ Yates, 354 
U.S. at 312. 
 228. Bereano, 706 F.3d at 579 (citation omitted). 
 229. Id. (citation omitted).  In Bereano, the Fourth Circuit relied on its precedent, United 
States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 648 (2012). Id. at 
578.  In Jefferson, the Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court principle espoused in 
Neder, finding the honest services error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; it explained 
that the jury had necessarily found facts supporting the defendant‘s convictions under the 
bribery honest services theory by finding the defendant guilty of the substantive bribery 
violations. See Jefferson, 674 F.3d at 362–63. 
 230. Sorich v. United States, 709 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2013).  Stated differently, the 
Seventh Circuit elaborated that ―if the evidence on the two fraud theories was so thoroughly 
coextensive that the jury could only find the defendant guilty or not guilty of both, then the 
conviction will stand even though one theory is later held to be legally invalid.‖ Id. (quoting 
Turner v. United States, 693 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 231. 709 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 232. Id. at 672–73.  The defendant had been charged with four counts of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 and was found guilty on two counts. See id. at 672–
73.  For more detail on the statute, see supra note 215. 
 233. Sorich, 709 F.3d at 672, 675.  The Seventh Circuit had determined that the relevant 
jobs constituted employment for purposes of the statute. See id. at 677 (citation omitted). 
 234. Id. at 671. 
 235. Id. at 674 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 
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―single scheme,‖ such that ―any honest services violation had to be 
premised on money/property fraud.‖236 
B.   Circuits Maintaining a Less Demanding Burden 
on the Government to Defend Harmlessness 
This section examines circuit and district court decisions from the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuits that have placed a less demanding burden post-Pulido on 
the government to defend harmlessness. 
1.   Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit looks to see whether there is a ―reasonable probability‖ 
that the jury convicted the defendant on the valid ground.237 
In Babb v. Lozowsky,238 the defendant was charged with robbery and 
murder.239  The jury was given two instructions, premised on different 
theories, under which it could find the defendant guilty of first-degree 
murder.240  The first instruction detailed the findings necessary to convict 
the defendant under a theory of ―willful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing,‖ while the second instruction detailed the findings necessary to 
convict the defendant under a theory of felony murder.241  The jury 
convicted the defendant by general verdict of first-degree murder with a 
deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon.242 
The defendant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which 
the District of Nevada granted.243  The district court granted relief based on 
its determination that:  (1) the first instruction provided to the jury was 
unconstitutional because it blurred the distinction between the 
premeditation and deliberation elements underlying the first-degree murder 
theory, thus erroneously relieving the government of its requisite burden to 
prove each element of the offense;244 and (2) Byford v. State,245 a Nevada 
Supreme Court case, which narrowed the conduct that qualified as first-
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Babb v. Lozowsky, 719 F.3d 1019, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds 
by Moore v. Helling, No. 12-15795, 2014 WL 3973407 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014).  After 
stating that Pulido did not provide guidance on how to assess the impact of an erroneous 
instruction in the context of a general verdict, the Ninth Circuit explained that ―[g]enerally, 
however, when considering whether erroneous instructions constitute harmless error, courts 
ask whether it is reasonably probable that the jury would still have convicted the petitioner 
on the proper instructions.‖ Id. at 1034 (citing Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1139 
(9th Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006)). 
 238. 719 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Helling, No. 
12-15795, 2014 WL 3973407 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) 
 239. Id. at 1024. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id.  Felony murder is murder that is committed during the perpetration of certain 
felonies, including robbery. See id. 
 242. Id. at 1022. 
 243. Id.  For a description of the writ of habeas corpus, see supra note 116. 
 244. See Babb, 719 F.3d at 1025.  Specifically, the first instruction failed because it did 
not provide independent definitions for ―deliberation‖ and ―premeditation.‖ See id. at 1028. 
 245. 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000). 
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degree murder by expanding and separating the premeditation, deliberation, 
and willfulness prongs, applied to the defendant because her conviction was 
not final at the time Byford was decided.246  The district court conducted a 
harmless error review and found that the error in the first instruction was 
not harmless because the court had ―grave doubt‖ as to whether the jurors 
had relied on the valid felony murder theory.247  The State appealed the 
district court‘s judgment.248 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court‘s holding, though it 
determined that the state court holding contained an error subject to 
harmless error review.249  The court emphasized that harmless error review 
was appropriate under Pulido despite the fact that the defendant had been 
convicted pursuant to a general verdict.250  The Ninth Circuit explained that 
it was unnecessary to determine whether the jury would have nonetheless 
convicted the defendant had it been properly instructed, because the court 
determined, with reasonable probability, that the jury had found the 
defendant guilty under the valid felony murder theory.  Accordingly, the 
erroneous premeditation instruction251 did not have a substantial effect on 
the jury‘s decision.252  The court emphasized that it was not holding that the 
jury could have convicted the defendant based on the valid felony murder 
theory, but rather, under its interpretation of Pulido, that it was reasonably 
certain that the jury had convicted the defendant on the valid theory, and 
 
 246. Babb, 719 F.3d at 1025, 1033. 
 247. Id. at 1025. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1033. 
 250. Id. at 1033–34.  The district court had concluded that the alternative theory error was 
not harmless in large part because of the jury‘s general verdict. Id. at 1033.  The Ninth 
Circuit emphasized that ―[g]eneral verdict forms can further blur an already opaque 
decisionmaking process, leaving us with the sort of grave doubt that prevents us from 
concluding an error was harmless.‖ Id. at 1035 (citation omitted). 
 251. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court‘s finding as to the state court‘s first error 
that it had subjected to harmless error review, but agreed with its holding as to the second 
ground. Id. at 1028, 1030.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court‘s first ground 
because the Nevada Supreme Court had determined that the controlling case, which required 
the government to meet its burden of proof as to the deliberation and premeditation elements 
separately, was a change in law rather than a clarification of the law. Id. at 1029.  While a 
clarification requires that the state vacate a conviction—even if it has been affirmed on 
appeal—a change in the law does not. Id. at 1028 (citing Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 
(2001)).  It is a question of state law whether a term in a statute is a distinct element for 
purposes of proving a crime that has an independent definition. Id. at 1029 (citing Schad v. 
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991)). 
 252. Id. at 1035.  The court made this determination based on the rationale that to convict 
the defendant of the felony murder theory the jury only needed to find that:  (1) the 
defendant was guilty of robbery; and (2) the victim was killed during the perpetration of the 
robbery. Id. at 1034.  The jury had found the defendant guilty of robbery, and the court 
determined that based on the evidence there was ―no doubt‖ the victim had been killed 
during the robbery. Id.  The court also relied on the fact that the prosecution had focused 
almost exclusively on the felony-murder theory. Id.  Thus, the court declared that the 
―overwhelming evidence supporting the felony murder theory‖ led it to ―be reasonably 
certain that no juror convicted Babb based on premeditation.‖ Id.  The Ninth Circuit pointed 
out that there was ―no way to be absolutely certain what leads a juror to a particular 
decision.‖ Id. at 1033 n.9.  Moreover, the court emphasized that absolutely certainty was not 
required, as that was not the Supreme Court standard under Pulido. Id. 
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thus the erroneous instruction did not have a substantial impact on the 
conviction.253 
In Del Toro v. Martel,254 the defendant was convicted of a number of 
offenses, including stalking and first-degree burglary.255  The defendant 
eventually filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which a court 
in the Central District of California granted.256  The defendant alleged that 
he was entitled to relief due to the trial court‘s erroneous burglary 
instruction to the jury.257  To commit burglary, the defendant must have 
entered the home in furtherance of committing a felony (the ―predicate 
offense‖).258  The defendant claimed the instruction was erroneous because 
two of the predicate offenses provided—stalking and attempted witness 
dissuasion—were legally invalid.259  Because the jury had returned a 
general verdict, the defendant contended that it was unclear upon which 
felony offenses the jury had relied.260 
A court in the Central District of California applied Pulido to determine 
whether the alleged alternative theory jury instruction error was 
harmless.261  The court explained that even if there had been an error in the 
jury instructions with respect to certain burglary theories, ―substantial 
evidence‖ existed to support the valid alternative burglary theories, which 
the defendant did not challenge.262  Moreover, the court emphasized that a 
―reasonable juror could have found‖ that the defendant ―possessed the intent 
to stalk, criminally threaten, and dissuade [the victim].‖263  Consequently, 
the court held that because such a finding was sufficient to support the 
defendant‘s conviction, any error in the alternative theories was 
harmless.264 
2.   Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit also places a lesser burden on the government to defend 
a conviction by requiring a showing that ―the record contains evidence that 
 
 253. Id. at 1035. 
 254. No. SA-CV-09-0554, 2010 WL 4718796 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010). 
 255. Id. at *1.  The facts, which are adopted largely from the California Court of Appeals 
opinion on direct review, reveal that the defendant on multiple occasions assaulted the 
victim, both verbally and physically, and also entered her home without her consent. Id. at 
*2–4. 
 256. Id. at *1.  For an explanation of the writ of habeas corpus, see supra note 116. 
 257. Del Toro, 2010 WL 4718796, at *2, *17 (citation omitted). 
 258. Id. at *17.  The burglary instruction provided by the district court stated:  ―[e]very 
person who enters any building with the specific intent to commit the felony crime[s] of 
stalking, criminal threats, dissuading a witness[,] or attempting to dissuade a witness is guilty 
of the crime of burglary.‖ Id. 
 259. Id.   
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at *19. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (emphasis added). 
 264. Id. at *19–20. 
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could rationally lead to [an acquittal] with respect to the [valid theory of 
guilt].‖265 
In United States v. Skilling, the defendant, the former CEO of Enron 
Corporation, was charged with, among other things, one count of 
conspiracy,266 resulting from his efforts to fraudulently manipulate Enron‘s 
financial statements to affect its share price and so mislead investors.267  
The jury instructions allowed the jury to convict the defendant of 
conspiracy under a number of theories, including securities fraud and 
honest services fraud.268  The jury subsequently returned a general verdict 
finding the defendant guilty of conspiracy.269 
The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated 
the applicability of the honest services theory of conspiracy to the 
defendant‘s case.270 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that though the jury may have 
relied on the invalid honest services fraud theory, this only revealed that an 
alternative theory error had occurred, which did not necessarily mandate 
reversal.271  Following a review of the record, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury‘s verdict would have been the 
same absent the erroneous instruction, because the jury was presented with 
―overwhelming evidence‖ of the defendant‘s conspiracy to commit 
securities fraud.272 
The Fifth Circuit stressed that it conducted its analysis in line with the 
alternative theory error analysis set forth in, and endorsed by, Pulido, which 
does not require that a jury necessarily find facts establishing guilt on a 
valid theory for an alternative theory error to be harmless.273  In doing so, 
the court highlighted the difference between its line of analysis and the 
analysis seemingly followed by the circuits placing a heavier burden on the 
government.  The court concluded that the error was nonetheless harmless 
 
 265. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1905 (2012) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)) (emphasis added).  The 
Fifth Circuit noted that prior to Pulido it had applied an ―impossible to tell‖ standard of 
harmless error review. Id. at 482 n.1 (citing United States v. Howard, 517 F.3d 731, 736 (5th 
Cir. 2008)).  It emphasized that this standard was derived from Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298 (1957), and thus was invalid following Pulido. Id.  The Yates standard is a part of 
the Stromberg line of cases—which was developed when constitutional errors required 
automatic reversal—and holds that a general verdict must be set aside when ―it is 
supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the 
jury selected.‖ Yates, 354 U.S. at 312; see also Skilling, 638 F.3d at 482 n.1. 
 266. Skilling, 638 F.3d at 481. 
 267. Id. at 488.  The defendant‘s efforts included:  making misleading statements to 
Enron‘s board of directors, transferring losses from one division of Enron to the financial 
statements of another division so that the struggling division would appear more profitable, 
and representing a certain division to investors as low-risk, when in fact most of its profits 
were derived from ―highly volatile trading operations.‖ Id. at 484–85 & 484 n.4. 
 268. Id. at 481.   
 269. Id.  The defendant was also convicted of twelve counts of securities fraud, five 
counts of making false representations to auditors, and one count of insider trading. Id. 
 270. See id. (citation omitted). 
 271. Id. at 483. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. at 482. 
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because ―the jury had the option to rely on a pure honest services theory to 
convict Skilling‖ that had ―no effect on the strength of the evidence going 
to the other alleged fraudulent schemes and on whether that evidence 
satisfies the Neder standard.‖274 
III.   DETERMINING THE CORRECT STANDARD: 
WHAT AMOUNTS TO ―SUBSTANTIAL AND INJURIOUS‖? 
As Justice Traynor noted, harmless error review is ―one of the most 
complex‖ tasks for reviewing courts.275  In their review, courts must not 
only first determine and then interpret the applicable legal standard but also 
subsequently engage in a fact-specific inquiry of the record.  While the 
circuit courts appear to have differing interpretations of the harmless error 
review standard as applied to alternative theory errors, all face general 
verdicts making it difficult to know how the jury came to its conclusion.  
Accordingly, this section first examines the costs and benefits of using 
special verdicts in situations involving alternative theory jury instructions.  
Special verdicts would provide a reviewing court with a clearer indication 
of the basis for the jury‘s verdict, thus making the question of whether an 
error is harmless easier to answer regardless of the standard applied. 
This section then homes in on the distinctions that have resulted from the 
circuit courts‘ diverging interpretations of the harmless error standard as 
applied to alternative theory errors and proposes a possible solution to the 
conflict. 
A.   An Alternative Possibility:  Requiring Special Verdicts 
in Cases Involving Alternative Theory Errors 
The juries in the cases examined in this Note convicted their respective 
defendants pursuant to general verdicts.276  Each respective reviewing court 
then engaged in an oftentimes elaborate and extensive inquiry to attempt to 
deduce how the jury arrived at its decision to convict the defendant.  If the 
jury had been required to render a special verdict, however, the reviewing 
court could have more easily located the error, and thus, its effect.277  The 
inquiry would then be far more straightforward because the court would 
have in its arsenal additional specific information as to the jury‘s 
conclusion—most relevantly for purposes of this Note—knowledge as to 
 
 274. Id.  United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Saks, 
964 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1992), are Fifth Circuit cases that set out standards similar to the 
higher burden circuits, which hold that ―an alternative-theory error is harmless if the jury, in 
convicting on an invalid theory of guilt, necessarily found facts establishing guilt on a valid 
theory.‖ Id.  The court noted that Skilling‘s codefendant, Ken Lay, another former CEO and 
chairman of Enron, was charged with several counts of honest services fraud. Id. at 483.  It is 
unclear to what extent the Court‘s narrowing of honest services fraud would have had on 
Lay‘s case, as Lay died prior to his sentencing, and thus his conviction was vacated. United 
States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 275. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Part II. 
 277. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
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which theory of guilt the jury had relied upon to convict the defendant.278  
The court, at the outset of its review, could then entirely disregard an 
erroneous instruction if the jury did not rely on that instruction to convict 
the defendant. 
Furthermore, requiring a special verdict would make jury instructions 
more specific, potentially making them easier to understand.279  
Additionally, because a jury rendering a special verdict provides answers to 
specific questions as opposed to delivering a finding of ―guilty‖ or ―not 
guilty‖ (in a criminal proceeding), the jury‘s determinations are less likely 
to be tainted by subconscious bias or prejudice toward a defendant.280  This 
would, in turn, bolster societal confidence in juries‘ verdicts.281 
Finally, implementing a system that requires more frequent use of special 
verdicts would not only provide the benefits just discussed to both the jury 
and court, but may also promote uniformity among the circuits.  The 
difference between the higher burden and lower burden circuits would fall 
away if it were obvious whether or not the jury had relied on the erroneous 
instruction. 
Nonetheless, the general verdict comes with its own set of advantages, 
which make it unrealistic to expect increased use of special verdicts as a 
solution to the problem of the circuits‘ differing interpretations.  Whereas 
the special verdict may create more opportunity for probing on appeal in an 
unsettled or changing area of the law, the general verdict limits the scope 
for unnecessary retrials by ensuring that the jury does not return 
inconsistent responses (as is possible where a special verdict form includes 
multiple questions) and implying findings in favor of the prevailing party 
on contested issues.282  Moreover, the general verdict may be considered 
clearer to the jury because it is easier to understand that the conclusion 
reached must be either for or against the defendant.  Thus, the general 
verdict may promote more expedient, efficient deliberations, whereas the 
special verdict may lead to longer deliberations and more hung juries.  
Therefore, it is ultimately unlikely that the special verdict form will 
displace the more traditional general verdict approach, which is supported 
by the prevalent ideology that the jury‘s function is to provide ―man-on-the-
street justice‖ rather than specific and complex findings intended for 
professionals.283  Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the existing 
circuit split in greater detail to find a possible solution. 
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B.   Who Has It Right?:  Differentiating the Circuits’ Conflicting 
Applications of the Harmless Error Review Standard  
to Alternative Theory Errors 
Because of the multitude of elements that factor into a court‘s 
determination as to whether an error is harmless, such as the type of error in 
the jury instruction,284 the reasons for the courts‘ diverging interpretations 
are not simply complex but often opaque. 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether some of the circuits that impose 
a heavier burden on the government to defend an error as harmless do so 
merely because it would not have made a difference had they applied a 
lesser burden.285  Indeed, given the fact that most errors are found to be 
harmless,286 it could be argued that the standard applied is a matter of lesser 
importance that has little impact on the actual result reached in a particular 
case.  It is also possible that the courts may manipulate the standard applied 
in order to reach desired results, and that a court that normally imposes a 
higher burden on the government might in fact revert to a less demanding 
interpretation if necessary to find an error harmless. 
Despite the fact that the results of the two different approaches may often 
be the same, however, there is a real difference between them.  The Fifth 
Circuit (which is a circuit that imposes a less demanding burden on the 
government to defend an error as harmless) has made clear that it is of the 
view that there are at least two harmless error standards that can apply, and 
that one standard imposes a heavier burden on the government to prove 
harmlessness than the other.287 
The impact of imposing a higher burden on the government is clear from 
an examination of some of the cases discussed in this Note.  For example, 
had the Tenth Circuit required what the Fifth Circuit requires to reverse a 
conviction for being not harmless, the defendant-appellant‘s conviction in 
McKye may have been affirmed.  Under the interpretation of the harmless 
error standard endorsed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Skilling, for 
example, the Tenth Circuit would have required a showing that the evidence 
contained in the record ―could rationally lead to‖ an acquittal under the 
valid theory of guilt in order to reverse the conviction.288  The Fifth Circuit 
explained that ―overwhelming evidence‖ to support the conviction of the 
defendant on the valid theory is sufficient to find an error harmless.289  
Applying this interpretation to McKye, where the government contended 
 
 284. Compare United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011) (instructional 
error due to change in the law), with United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104, 1110 (10th Cir. 
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that the record contained ―ample‖ evidence for conviction, the Fifth Circuit 
likely would have found the alternative theory error harmless even though 
the Tenth Circuit did not.290  This may be in part because the Tenth Circuit 
was not adequately presented with the relevant evidence (though the 
government‘s brief did provide at least provide a direct citation to the 
record).291 
While assessing cases from the less demanding circuits is not as 
illuminating because most errors are found to be harmless,292 the 
examination is still worthwhile, not least because the Fifth Circuit in 
Skilling expressly explained that it was not applying a harmless error 
standard that placed a heavier burden on the government.  For example, in 
Babb and Del Toro, imposing a heavier burden on the government to prove 
the respective errors were harmless may have resulted in granting relief to 
the defendants.293  In Babb, the Ninth Circuit held the jury instruction error 
harmless, finding that it was ―reasonably certain‖ that the jury had 
convicted the defendant on the valid theory of guilt.294  In Del Toro, the 
court held the jury instruction harmless, finding that ―substantial evidence‖ 
existed to support the valid theory and that a ―reasonable juror could have 
found‖ the defendant had the requisite intent to support the alternative 
theory.295 
Examining these two cases in a circuit that imposed a heavier burden on 
the government would likely have led to the opposite result, in favor of 
relief to the defendants.  Under the Seventh Circuit‘s standard as stated in 
Sorich, for example, courts look to determine whether ―the trial evidence 
was such that the jury must have convicted the [defendants] on both 
theories.‖296  This was clearly not the case in Babb and Del Toro, based on 
the courts‘ opinions.297 
Ultimately, therefore, imposing a heavier burden on the government to 
defend an error as harmless does make a difference (and is the more tenable 
position under Pulido).298  The government should carry the burden of 
proof of showing that the error was harmless,299 because it has significantly 
more resources than most defendants.300  Fairness to the defendant is 
particularly compelling, as there are many elements of the review process 
that cut against the defendant, as noted by several commentators.301  Thus, 
imposing a more demanding standard on the government at this stage 
ensures maximum fairness in favor of the defendant.   
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Commentators have found that federal appellate-level reversal rates have 
decreased over time and this may be tied to the fact that appellate courts are 
spending less time reviewing district court decisions.302  Judge Posner has 
argued that:  ―[T]he less time an appellate court spends on a case the more 
likely it is simply to affirm the district court.‖303  Another commentator has 
noted that lower reversal rates indicate a ―level of affinity‖ between district 
and circuit court judges that could undermine the independence of the 
reviewing court‘s assessment.304  Siding with those circuits that impose a 
higher burden on the government to defend a conviction is therefore the 
most appropriate means of resolving the conflict among the circuits when it 
comes to harmless error review in the context of alternative theory jury 
instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of alternative theory error is problematic because the 
diverging tests among the circuit courts create the potential for inconsistent 
relief for defendants on appeal.  Benefits, such as improved clarity, likely 
would not outweigh the costs of requiring juries to provide a special verdict 
rather than a general verdict of ―guilty‖ or ―not guilty.‖  Consequently, it is 
necessary to choose one standard from among the diverging circuit court 
interpretations of Pulido in order to ensure consistency.  Imposing a more 
demanding burden on all reviewing courts will not only promote uniformity 
but also will safeguard the rights of defendants and, therefore, is the more 
appropriate choice. 
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